Abstract: This paper estimates a VAR with time-varying parameters to characterize the changes in Federal Reserve policy that occurred from 2000 through 2007 and assess how those changes affected the performance of the U.S. economy. The results point to a gradual shift in the Fed's emphasis over this period, away from stabilizing inflation and towards stabilizing output. A persistent deviation of the federal funds rate from the settings prescribed by the estimated monetary policy rule appears more important, however, in causing inflation to overshoot its target in the years leading up to the Great Recession.
The statistical analysis presented here is directed at assessing the role that monetary policy may have played as a possible source of that change. Our focus on monetary policy is motivated by two interrelated sets of considerations. First, a host of studies, including Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2003) , Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) , and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) Investigating the role that monetary policy might have played in switching from the economic activity observed prior to 2000 to that after 2007 is also motivated by the analysis presented in Taylor (2009) . Specifically, Taylor argues that the Federal Reserve set the stage for the financial crisis of 2007 and the Great Recession that followed by deviating persistently from the interest rate rule that he had introduced earlier (in Taylor [1993] ) to describe more systematic policy over the period from 1987 through 1992. Taylor's subsequent (2009) comparison between the actual trajectory of the federal funds rate from 2000 through 2007 and the values prescribed by his rule suggests that monetary policy had been too accommodative over most of this period, fueling a boom-bust cycle in housing and other interest-sensitive sectors of the economy. 2 Our own preliminary look at the data lends some support to Taylor's claims. Figure 1 plots quarterly series over 1960 through 2007 for three variables: Inflation, the output gap, and the federal funds rate. 3 These graphs confirm that the Federal Reserve responded to what was, in retrospect, a relatively brief and mild recession in 2001 with an extended period of very low interest rates. Moreover, the Fed kept its target for the funds rate at exceptionally low levels even after inflation began to rise in 2004. Together, these observations can be interpreted in at least two ways. The data could reflect a possible shift in the emphasis of monetary policy away from stabilizing inflation and towards stabilizing output. Alternatively, rather than reflecting a deliberate decision to switch the focus of monetary policy, the data could reflect a persistent deviation by policymakers away from systematic behavior of any kind, perhaps signaling a shift 2 Barnett (2012, pp.133-134) also blames the housing boom on overly expansionary monetary policy in the years following 2001, arguing that Federal Reserve officials might have noticed this error had they used appropriate measures of money instead of the federal funds rate to gauge the stance of their policies. Barnett adds that a subsequent policy tightening, signaled by a slowdown in the growth rates of his preferred, Divisia monetary aggregates, helped trigger the chain of mortgage defaults that led to the financial crisis. That restrictive monetary policy preceded the onset of recession in 2007 is an argument also made by Hetzel (2009 Hetzel ( , 2012 as well as economists affiliated with "market monetarism;" the latter reach this conclusion by comparing the paths of nominal GDP and potential GDP. With our focus on monetary policy, this paper abstracts from the housing crisis, credit derivatives, and other possible causes of the Great Recession. One treatment of non-monetary explanations of the decline and subsequent slow recovery can be found in Stock and Watson (2012) . from a rules-based framework to one relying more on discretionary actions. 4 Either interpretation, however, would suggest a potentially important departure from the desirable features of policy that held sway during the Great Moderation.
These considerations are reinforced by the additional data plotted in Figure 2 . Shown in the graph are the actual path for the federal funds rate and the values implied by one version of the Taylor Rule. 5 The data indicate that the funds rate was above the value implied by the rule through the latter half of the 1990s, potentially explaining the negative output gap and low inflation observed over the same interval. In the early 2000s, however, the funds rate was persistently below the value implied by the rule; consistent with Taylor's (2009) Reserve officials to deviate from the behavior prescribed by such a rule and how, more exactly, these policy changes affected the paths of inflation and output.
To answer these questions, we use the data shown in figure 1 to estimate a vector autoregression with time-varying parameters and stochastic volatility using Bayesian methods introduced and outlined by Cogley and Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005) . This model is capable of capturing a range of ways in which monetary policy can change and, in particular, distinguishes between whether the central bank adjusted the strength of its systematic 4 Here, the contrast we wish to draw between "rules" and "discretion" comes closest to the distinction as it is made by Taylor (1993, pp.198-199) : the former refers to the policymaker's systematic response to changes in the economy as summarized by a small number of state variables, such as inflation and the output gap, whereas the latter alludes to less predictable actions motivated, perhaps, by the policymaker's own judgment. In Barro and Gordon's (1983) theoretical framework, by contrast, a "discretionary" policymaker sets inflation too high in an effort to exploit a Phillips curve trade-off, but still behaves in perfectly predictable manner; Ireland (1999) presents statistical analysis designed to test whether Federal Reserve policy appears to be discretionary in this, alternative, sense. The three variables are collected in a 3x1 vector 
and decomposing the covariance matrix
where the 3x3 matrix
is lower triangular with ones along its diagonal and the 3x3 matrix
is diagonal, the reduced form (1) can be rewritten more conveniently as
where 
where all of the serially uncorrelated innovations are assumed to be jointly normally distributed, with
and 0 m n × denotes an m n × matrix of zeros. In (7), Q is 21x21, S is 3x3, and W is 3x3 and diagonal, so that the standard deviations in t σ evolve as independent, geometric random walks. Following Primiceri (2005) , it is assumed that S is block-diagonal, with one non-zero element in the first column of the first row and three distinct non-zero elements in the second and third columns of the second and third rows. Hence, Q has 231 distinct elements, S has four distinct non-zero elements, and W has three non-zero elements.
The Cholesky factorization of the symmetric, positive definite covariance matrix t Ω shown in (2) always exists and is unique; hence, the model can be written in the form of (3) without loss of generality. However, under the additional identifying assumption -made throughout much of the literature that works with VARs -that inflation and the output gap respond to monetary policy shocks only after a one-period lag, the third equation in (3) 
where the coefficients on the lagged values of inflation, the output gap, and the interest rate are those from the third rows of the matrices (8) are estimated within the multivariate system (3), the model also can be used to trace out the implications that these changes in monetary policy had, over the same period, on inflation and the output gap.
Estimation Strategy
Going back to the earliest work by Litterman (1979) (2005), which then imply, through (4)- (7), normal priors for all three sets of time-varying coefficients.
For Q , the two diagonal blocks 1 S and 2 S of S , and each diagonal element ,
,40),
,2), outlined by Carter and Kohn (1994) and Fruhwirth-Schnatter (1994) 
Estimation Results

Figures 3 and 4 focus on the time-varying parameters of the monetary policy rule (8).
Simulation Experiments
To assess how these changes in policy have affected U.S. economic performance, figure   10 reports results from two experiments in which the estimated model is used to describe counterfactual scenarios. In the first, the coefficients of the policy rule ( 
Conclusion
Although the Federal Reserve never had announced that it follows a rule to guide monetary policy decisions, Taylor (1993) described a framework the Fed might use to determine its target value for the federal funds rate. Despite its simplicity, this rule appeared to track quite well actual Federal Reserve policy decisions over the period from 1987 through 1992 that was the focus of Taylor's original study. Moreover, the rule's parsimony meant that it could be incorporated easily into even the simplest of New Keynesian models, which focus on the behavior of the same three variables -inflation, the output gap, and the short-term nominal interest rate -that appear in the rule itself. For both of these reasons, the Taylor Rule has become a benchmark for assessing and evaluating how Federal Reserve policy has changed over longer periods of time, well beyond the short sample first considered by Taylor.
Here, we estimate a version of the Taylor 
